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ISTORIANS TEND NOT TO BE VERY THEORETICAL; they prefer to work with 
source material, not textual metaphors. In other words, not many have 
taken the linguistic turn, or taken it seriously enough either to address 
the challenges or embrace the opportunities it presents to them. Historically, of 
course, or, rather, historiographically, the Linguistic Turn of the 20th century was 
to be taken up by intellectual historians; and so it has been. They would still have 
to make the case for taking the turn to the rest of the discipline, and some of 
them have been attempting it. But what complicates that project is the fact that 
even as the turn has emerged as a matter of intellectual history, the discipline of 
history has turned intellectual history into social and/or/slash cultural history. 
The new history that has arisen from this historiographical development has 
taken on some of the attributes of the linguistic turn, but often without the 
theoretical rigor or consistency—without making the epistemological move that 
gives the turn its torque. It remains, then, for intellectual historians to take the 
turn to their less theoretical and textual fellows—in the interest of the discipline 
in general and of intellectual history in particular. 
Elizabeth A. Clark is an eminent historian of late ancient Christianity, and is an 
actual intellectual historian in that she works with the complex theological texts 
of the early Church Fathers. She has seen her part of the discipline of history take 
its socio-cultural turn, and does appreciate the ways in which it has illuminated 
the histories of early Church women and of the theologically unorthodox, among 
others. But she argues that that turn was not explicitly linguistic, and so does not 
address and could not articulate the work that is still to be done with Augustine 
and Tertullian, among others, work that would be part of a new and theoretically 
revitalized intellectual history.  
Clark wants to take the linguistic turn to her own historical work; but her interest 
in the turn has arisen from her work, and is in the interest of the discipline. 
H 
 KNOWLTON: Book Profile: History, Theory, Text   140 
 JCRT 7.1 (Winter 2005) 
Working historians do research in their specialized fields, but they ought also to 
be involved in, or at least informed about, current discussions of 
historiographical matters. Clark is right about the turn; and it might be said that 
she takes the turn, because she can take it. The linguistic turn does mean that 
words do not refer to things: most historians who take on the turn can’t seem to 
get past that. If words do not refer to things, then the correspondence theory of 
truth can’t be taken literally; and this does make doing history less 
straightforward than it used to be. But historians have known for a long time that 
to write history “wie es eigentlich gewesen” is not actually as easy as it sounds. The 
past is not present; historical sources are the only way historians have to get at the 
past so as to say anything about it that would signify as historiography. 
Clark begins, then, by asserting that the linguistic turn does not mean the end of 
history, as some historians have assumed. In the first place, the turn itself has a 
history: it can be researched and so found in the linguistic philosophy and 
literary theory of the twentieth century. The implications of the turn for the 
discipline of history can be read about in such books as That Noble Dream by 
Peter Novick, which Clark makes significant use of in her first chapter. But 
because Novick’s book is more an institutional than an intellectual history, Clark 
surveys in more detail the work of Anglo-American philosophers and French 
literary theorists, though she might have said more about Germanic 
hermeneutics. And as she takes the turn she does stick to history, in that she 
always has in view history’s particular epistemological problems. She observes, 
for instance, that Rankean historians, who did not think that history should be at 
all philosophical, nevertheless assumed that it should be scientific. A little 
intellectual history of this shows that the scientific assumptions involved are 
straightforwardly Cartesian. Give this history a linguistic turn, and the Cartesian 
epistemology is exploded. Clark also tells of the traditionally scientific history 
being, in fact, narrative. This would line it up with the linguistic turn’s narrative 
strand; but, she goes on to relate, traditional historians, throughout most of the 
twentieth century, did not attend to developments in science, philosophy, or 
literary studies. They will admit that the objectivity of their history is based on 
fragments of the past, and that the documentary fragments have only a linguistic 
existence; but none of this has had much of an impact on their epistemology. 
And yet, according to the terms of the turn, if the past per se cannot be 
empirically perceived, then the history as written can not correspond to it, no 
matter how resolutely the correspondence is assumed and unexamined. 
Clark surveys the structuralist version of the turn, and discusses structuralism’s 
notorious hostility to history. Saussure’s structural linguistics represented a 
break from historical philology. He incidentally rejected the Adamic view of the 
origin of language; he more deliberately avoided speaking of words as naming 
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things. Instead he spoke of signs, signifying by difference within a linguistic 
system. He implied that language is just one signifying system among others, 
that the others were still to be described, and that they would be described by 
something called semiology. So far the linguistic turn seems not to have taken 
over the world; but as semiologists such as Roland Barthes took the turn to the 
wider culture, the significance of the descriptions seemed to confirm the turn. 
For Saussure, language was semiotic; for Barthes, semiology was linguistic. To 
describe the world requires language; the world without language still exists 
(one may say), but is insignificant (one may say no more). All this time, 
according to Clark, historians still assumed that words referred to things, and 
that their historical accounts corresponded to the truth. 
 “The Territory of the Historian” is covered in a chapter that analyzes French 
Annalistes, French and Italian microhistorians, and British Marxist historians. 
These projects were mostly social history, but none of them took much of a 
linguistic turn. Annales history was a response to positivism, but was no more 
philosophical. It covered the longue duree, but had some presentist interests, and 
did raise some issues of historiographical significance. It was analytical rather 
than narrative, but in its use of demographic statistics it veered toward neo-
positivism. It was open to interdisciplinary influences, but turned more toward 
the social sciences; it studied language, but took a pre-structuralist view of it. The 
Annalistes were intellectual historians only where they did the histories of 
mentalites; but mentalites didn’t have philosophies, and so their histories had no 
epistemological twist. Apart from the Annalistes, however, there were some 
French developments in 20th century historiography that did become involved in 
the turn. Paul Veyne, for example, wrote a book on how to write history, and 
called it epistemological. He was interested in literature as well as philosophy; 
and his historiography also includes an endorsement of the work of Michel 
Foucault. What Clark calls “The Post-Structuralist Return of History in France” 
involved a renewed interest in the history of events, following les evenements; a 
take on intertextuality that read texts as woven into history; and the turn of 
Foucault from his structuralist archaeology to his post-structuralist genealogy, in 
which archival research finds evidence of diachronic discursivity. 
Meanwhile, microhistorians were studying the less significant events of more 
humble historical lives. In works such as Carlo Ginzburg’s The Cheese and the 
Worms and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s Montaillou, careful archival research into 
specific historical moments is informed by both a conventional emphasis on the 
elite and literate culture that generates most historical source material, and an 
up-to-date interest in the popular and oral culture in which most of the “little” 
people lived. Microhistory has had its critics: it has been found too empathetic, or 
eccentric; and some fault has been found with its use of sources to serve its 
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purposes. Clark’s criticism is that, as with the Annalistes, microhistorians have 
not really taken the linguistic turn; have not taken on the theory that articulates 
the turn, with its epistemological implications for all historical work.  
Among Marxist historians an interest in the experience of the working classes 
emphasizes their historical agency; and like all who do “history from below” 
they do not want agency undermined by a consideration of its linguistic 
significance. In fact, a linguistically-turned take on human agency, as opposed to 
impersonal determinism, would describe precisely what it means and how it 
works; and would not negate the making of the working class or anything else in 
history. Now Marxist history was asserting itself against a conservative 
historiography that was no more theoretical; but there was also a debate between 
E. P. Thompson and Louis Althusser that Clark considers significant. Althusser’s 
theoretical Marxism emphasized the epistemological break between the 
humanistic and the scientific Marx; Thompson’s historiography described a 
humanistic continuity. In his experience, scientific Marxism turned to Stalinism, 
and so his work, in the interest of the English working class, focused with 
socialist humanism upon its experience. This looks to French theory like 
conventional English common sense; more to the point, Clark points out, it 
overlooks the ways in which “experience” is articulated in the discourses of 
workers and their historians. The historian Eric Hobsbawm is also cited by Clark 
as a humanist Marxist who insists that human subjects must be allowed to be 
historical agents, and as one who has more definitively dismissed the linguistic 
turn as a mere intellectual fashion. It must not be allowed, he has argued, to 
undermine the discipline of history with its postmodern relativism. In short, 
Marxist history too has resisted the enormous condescension of epistemology.  
Throughout her survey of the territory and her analysis of its history and theory, 
Clark is anticipating her return to her own intellectual history, the history of 
premodern theological thought. But since she is also, in a way, telling a story, 
there is also a chapter on narrative. She reminds her readers that as 19th century 
historians were turning from gentlemanly letters to scholarly research, they were 
also tending to insist that the more literary ways of writing history give way to a 
more scientific writing. By the time the Annalistes were at their work, not only 
had narrative been displaced by analysis, but events of the sort that had been 
narrated were instead dissolved in the longue duree. With the eventful return of 
narrative history came narrative theory. Historical narratives did not, of course, 
simply represent the past as it actually happened; but then neither did more 
scientific historiography. What was of theoretical interest was that historians 
were writing about the past in a narrative form; and what was to be theorized 
was the ways in which narrative accounts of the past represented the interests of 
the historical writer, and constituted for the readers an historical understanding 
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of the subject. Clark recounts the analytical philosopher Arthur Danto’s 
argument that the narrative organization of facts from the past gives history its 
significance; and the phenomenological and hermeneutic philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur’s argument that humans need their history to be narrated, if it is to be 
meaningful for them. Historians such as Lawrence Stone returned to narrative 
because the more scientific historiography had not turned out to be adequate to 
the past; others, such as Natalie Zemon Davis, arrived at the conclusion that the 
historical source material that was supposed to be the scientific evidence was 
itself a sort of narrative. Roland Barthes enters the story again to point out the 
similarly linguistic narrativity of literature and history; and Hayden White 
follows to tell of narrative history’s linguistic metahistory. But, Clark again 
concludes, though White is an historian, most other historians have not paid 
much attention to his work. 
Hayden White is often thought of as a sort of New Intellectual Historian. Before 
finally arriving at her own new intellectual history, Clark surveys the old 
intellectual history, beginning with A. O. Lovejoy and R. G. Collingwood. She 
does not really dispute the outdatedness of Lovejoy’s History of Ideas, but 
Collingwood she considers to have in some ways anticipated a linguistically-
turned intellectual history. According to Collingwood, historians are not 
perceivers of historical facts but re-thinkers of historical thoughts; and historical 
thinking is always informed by a current interest in historiographical matters. 
Still, those whose intellectual history has turned more social or cultural tend not 
to think much of the theory in which the linguistic turn is currently articulated. 
Again, Clark thinks that they should be, if not “turned,” then “attuned” to the 
turn, or at least “attentive” to it, to use her locutions. Here she turns to 
hermeneutics; and discusses the historicity of horizons, and the effectiveness of 
their fusion, in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. His concept of “Effective 
History” is, in a word, linguistic. Similarly, the Germanic History of Concepts 
can be understood as a linguistically-turned version of the older History of Ideas. 
The history of this idea in France can be read in the work of Michel Foucault, 
Michel de Certeau, and Roger Chartier. In the case of Foucault, the question has 
never been whether his work is turned, but whether it can be called historical. 
Clark argues that his archaeology of knowledge is a new history of ideas, and 
that his work with words and things is not referential but discursive. A 
Foucauldian discourse is not simply a structural language, but is a complex of 
historical practices. Foucault’s turn from archaeology to genealogy involves 
bodies, but the work is no less linguistic—there is no turning back on that. 
Michel de Certeau is critical of Foucault’s work at several points, but his 
intellectual history is “attuned” to the turn, and so involves some observations 
that most historians should be able to go along with. All historians, he says, have 
a theory of history, whether they acknowledge it or not. All history takes place in 
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the present, because the past is, literally, gone. The past can be said to speak, but 
only when it is written. And when historians write history they should pay 
attention not only to what they are writing about, but also to how they go about 
writing. Roger Chartier is another intellectual historian who has been involved in 
the historiography of the turn, and who in his historical work works with texts. 
But Clark questions whether he has actually taken the turn, because he has 
expressed a concern that historians such as Hayden White have taken it too far. 
Chartier’s work with texts compels him to reject—but apparently not to 
deconstruct—the dichotomies that traditionally inform textual work; but he 
insists on maintaining the traditional one between the linguistic and the real. In 
this way Clark comes to Dominic LaCapra, an old-fashioned new intellectual 
historian whose close and profound attention to the linguistic turn has 
articulated a turned take on texts that she will finally take to the texts of 
antiquity.  
And so, after a penultimate chapter in which she turns to and surveys the recent 
historiography about the traditional dichotomy of text and context, she arrives at 
last at her new intellectual history of late ancient Christianity. She recapitulates 
her position as a linguistically-turned intellectual historian, citing again the 
various theorists she has already surveyed. She observes that late ancient 
Christian studies went straight from a theological to a sociological focus, without 
taking a linguistic turn. She argues, though, that her field works with texts that 
are especially amenable to the turn. Again, the sociological or socio-cultural work 
that has been done has done some good; but without taking the linguistic turn it 
can’t really comprehend the textual complexities of Patristics. 
Clark points out that many of the theorists involved in the turn have taken an 
interest in the texts of Christian antiquity. At the same time, and probably 
because this in itself would not convince many historians of the period to take an 
interest in the turn, she addresses the question that is much more likely to occur 
to them: just what sort of history do linguistically-turned historians do? Here 
Clark turns to the work of Gabrielle Spiegel, whose “social logic of the text” as 
applied to medieval history would seem to confirm and complement Clark’s 
linguistically-turned late ancient history. In fact, though, Clark is critical of 
Spiegel for not taking the turn all the way, or for wanting to have it both ways. 
According to Clark, Spiegel acknowledges the discursive construction of reality, 
but resists the implication that a history of that reality is made only of its 
textuality. In other words, the social logic of the text is more social than textual. It 
is valuable and useful as socially-informed as opposed to linguistically-turned 
intellectual history, and so Clark does make use of it; but her project takes the 
turn further, and does not take it back. 
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Clark takes the turn to antiquity by first observing that in the time of the turn 
most ancient historians are classicists—that is, they already approach history by 
way of the language in which it is written. She observes further that the 
historians of antiquity were writers of a kind of literature. And then the historical 
writing of late ancient Christianity was less conventional than the pagan 
historiography that had developed to that point. All this is by way of 
demonstrating late ancient Christianity’s turn-worthiness. When Clark comes to 
read the patristic texts, she argues in various ways and in exemplary detail that it 
can’t make much sense to read them as if their words simply referred to an 
anterior antiquity. This is not your father’s Patristics. Clark describes, for 
example, the ways in which a patristic text involves the author function, is put 
into or comes out of context, contains aporias, and deploys metaphors. She turns 
an ideology critique upon Clement of Alexandria, and discourses upon the 
representation of women by Jerome, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, and 
Augustine of Hippo. In some of this she is summarizing some of her own earlier 
work. She concludes this work by applying postcolonialism to the early Christian 
late Roman Empire. Here she surveys the contributions of several scholars to the 
historiography of the topic. In the end, out of her survey there emerges the 
significance of this historical theoretical text. Historians of religious culture who 
are at all inclined to consider the linguistic exigencies of their discipline, should 
read Elizabeth Clark’s book. 
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